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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to present a framework for
incentive-compatible regulation that would enable regula-
tors to ensure that riskier banks maintain higher capital
holdings.
Under the precommitment approach, a bank
announces the appropriate level of capital that covers the
maximum value of expected loss that might arise in its
trading account. If the actual loss (after a certain period)
exceeds the announced value, the bank is penalised. This
framework creates the correct incentive for banks: The
banks choose the level of capital that minimises the total
cost, which consists of the expected cost of penalty and the
cost of raising capital.
Nevertheless, it is not certain that the regulator
will always implement the mechanism through which
banks accurately reveal their riskiness. To be more precise,
the approach relies solely on the first-order condition of
cost minimisation, in which the regulator need only offer a
unique penalty rate and let each bank select the amount of
capital that satisfies the first-order condition. This implies
that the regulator needs no information ex ante with regard
to the riskiness of each bank (that is, the regulator can
extract private information ex post by observing how much
capital each bank chooses to hold after setting the unique
penalty rate).
It is, however, questionable whether riskier banks
will always choose a higher level of capital. The choice of
capital holding depends on the bank’s private information,
such as the shape of the density function of its investment
return. Riskier banks may in fact choose smaller amounts
of capital. Thus, the normative capital requirement dictat-
ing that riskier banks should hold higher levels of capital
may not always be satisfied under the precommitment
approach. With this in mind, we examine an alternative
to the precommitment approach, in which the regulator
is viewed as offering incentive-compatible contracts that
consist of both the level of capital and the penalty rate,
and see whether banks fulfill the normative capital
requirement.
The paper is organised as follows: In the next sec-
tion, we briefly review the precommitment approach and
show that in some cases it may not be possible to deter-
mine each bank’s riskiness by observing how much capital
it decides to hold. In Section 3, we develop a model from
the perspective of mechanism design whereby the regulator
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designs a menu of contracts. We then examine under dif-
ferent scenarios whether the regulator could achieve the
norm where riskier banks decide to hold higher levels of
capital. Section 4 summarises the paper’s findings.
2. OUTLINE OF THE PRECOMMITMENT 
APPROACH
In this section, we briefly review the model set forth by
Kupiec and O’Brien (1995), who first proposed the pre-
commitment approach. We will examine the case where
monetary fines are used as a penalty and will discuss how
the fines work by letting banks hold optimal levels of
capital, according to the innate qualities of the assets in
their trading accounts.1
First, the net return of assets in banks’ trading
accounts is denoted by  , which follows the density func-
tion,  , and banks hold capital equivalent to  . In
the model, there are two cost factors—the cost associated
with raising capital and the expected cost of the penalty.
The penalty is imposed if the actual net loss exceeds the
precommitted amount (that is, if the net return is lower
than - , then the penalty is imposed). Assuming the pen-
alty is imposed proportional to the excess loss, the total
cost function is written as follows:
(1) ,
where h is the marginal cost of capital, and r is the penalty
rate. The first term represents the cost of raising capital.
The second term shows the total expected cost of the pen-
alty. Taking the first derivative with respect to  , we have
(2) .
Given the rate of penalty, banks choose their optimal levels
of capital, which satisfy equation 2.2
Although Kupiec and O’Brien do not go beyond
this point, let us extend the model in such a way that it
incorporates the riskiness of banks.3 Suppose now that two
types of banks exist: banks with riskier assets (H-type
banks), whose density function is denoted by  ,
and banks with less risky assets (L-type banks), whose den-
sity function is denoted by  . We assume the vari-
ance of   is larger than that of  . Then, we
can imagine one example of the minimum cost curves, for
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H-type and L-type banks, on which the first-order condi-
tion is always satisfied (Chart 1).
 is the minimum cost curve for H-type
banks, and   is the minimum cost curve for L-type
banks. The higher the penalty rate offered by the regulator,
the higher the capital requirement for banks to satisfy the
first-order condition. The figure also generalises the case
where H-type banks have a gentle curve when   is low,
while they have a steep curve when   is high. This occurs
because when   is low (that is, close to the mean of the
density function), an additional increase in the penalty rate
requires H-type banks to add more capital than L-type
banks must add to retain the first-order condition. The
magnitude of changes in the density function per one-unit
increase in capital level is less for H-type banks (whose
variance is larger) than for L-type banks. On the contrary,
when   is high (that is, close to the tail of the density
function), an additional increase in the penalty rate may
require L-type banks to add more capital than H-type
banks to reestablish the first-order condition. The reason is
that the magnitude of changes in its density function per
one-unit increase in capital level is less for L-type banks.
The following two situations could arise:
• If the regulator charges a penalty rate higher than
r2, then L-type banks choose to hold higher levels
of capital.
• If the regulator charges  , then H-type
banks choose to hold higher levels of capital.
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A summary of these situations follows. 
Kupiec and O’Brien assume that the regulator,
without knowing the banks’ riskiness, can allow banks to
reveal their riskiness by charging a unique penalty rate.4
Each bank, given the penalty rate, voluntarily chooses the
level of capital that minimises the total cost. The authors
further claim that the choice of capital level is incentive
compatible for every bank. But without knowing where the
minimum cost curves lie, the regulator cannot assess banks’
riskiness just by observing the levels of capital (that is,
high-risk banks sometimes hold more capital, sometimes
less). In this situation, we are not sure whether the regula-
tor can overcome private information (that is, the riskiness
of each bank) just by penalising at the uniform rate. 
Next, we suggest a general model in which the
regulator offers contracts that consist of the level of capital
and the penalty rate and lets banks select a contract—an
arrangement that enables the regulator to assess the
riskiness of each bank correctly. We will see how we could
satisfy the normative requirement that high-risk banks
hold higher levels of capital.
3. THE MODEL
The following model is designed to establish whether the
regulator could determine banks’ riskiness by offering
banks a menu of contracts and letting each select one. We
are interested in two points: How incentive compatibility
can be satisfied in both the precommitment approach and
the model presented below, and whether the normative
standard of capital requirements—whereby banks with
riskier assets choose to hold higher levels of capital than
those with less risky assets—is fulfilled.
3.1. SETUP OF THE MODEL
Two players participate in the game: the regulator and the
banks. The banks are categorised according to the innate
qualities of the assets in their trading accounts. For sim-
plicity, we assume there are two types of banks—H-type
(a bank whose portfolio consists of high-risk, or large-
variance, assets) and L-type (a bank whose portfolio
consists of low-risk assets). Although the banks know their
own types, the regulator does not know ex ante which bank
belongs to which type. One may argue, however, that the
regulator can learn each bank’s type through monitoring or
from the records of on-site supervision. Nevertheless, we
assume that most of the assets in the trading accounts are
held short term and that banks can form the portfolios
with different levels of riskiness. The assessment of the
riskiness of a portfolio at the time of on-site supervision
may therefore not be valid for a long time. Hence, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the regulator is uninformed about
the types. Remember, we are concerned with the quality of
the banks’ assets in their trading accounts. It may not be
appropriate to extend the same interpretation to the assets
in their banking accounts. Because these assets are held for
much longer periods, the information obtained through
monitoring is valid longer. The scope for private informa-
tion is therefore much more limited.
Next, let us explain the sequence of events in the
model. In each of the game’s three periods, the following
events take place.
Period 0
1. Banks collect one unit of deposits, whose rate of
interest is normalised to zero. The deposit has to
be paid back to depositors at the end of the game
(that is, in Period 2).
2. The banks then invest the money in financial
assets.
Period 1
1. The regulator offers a menu of contracts consisting
of different levels of required capital and penalty
rates corresponding to each capital requirement
level.
2. Banks choose a contract from the menu. For them,
accepting a contract means that they hold
 as capital.
Period 2
1. The return on investment,  , is realised. 
2. If the return fails to achieve the precommitted
level, the regulator penalises the bank.
Let the return on investment be a stochastic vari-
able in the range of  , and it follows a density func-
tion,  . We denote the return on investment by
 for an H-type bank, and   for an L-type
bank. We assume that the variance of   is larger
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than that of  , but we do not assume any specific
shape of distribution functions.5
The regulator penalises the bank if the net loss
from the investment,  , exceeds the precommitted
value  ; hence the penalty is imposed if  . Let the
penalty rate be denoted by  , so that the
amount of penalty is  .
We analyse the three following cases according to
the relative size of the cumulative density:6
Case  1:  for 
The cumulative density for H-type banks is always larger
than the one for L-type banks.7
Case 2: for   close to 0
for   close to 1
The cumulative density for H-type banks is larger when
the level of capital is close to 0; it is smaller when the level
of capital is close to 1.
Case 3: for   close to 0
for   close to 1
The cumulative density for H-type banks is smaller when
the level of capital is close to 0; it is larger when the level of
capital is close to 1.8
We now write the bank’s cost function as follows:
(3) ,
where   represents the cost function of the bank that has an
innate riskiness of   but announces the riskiness  . The first
term in this cost function is the expected cost of a penalty. The
second term is the cost associated with raising capital equiva-
lent to  , where   is the marginal cost of capital. Likewise,
the cost function of an L-type bank is as follows:
(4) .
3.2. REGULATOR’S PROGRAMME
Let us now analyse how the regulator designs the mechanism
in which the H-type and L-type banks reveal their types
truthfully. The following programme is a starting point:9
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The loss function of the regulator consists of both
the deviation of capital from the level specified by the
first-order condition and the difference between capital
holdings of banks with different risk levels. The term in
parentheses after   represents any capital holding that is
not equivalent to the optimal level. Such a case is regarded
as costly for the regulator. This applies to both L-type and
H-type banks. The term after   shows that the regu-
lator is willing to let high-risk banks hold more capital. As
long as high-risk banks hold more capital, the regulator
does not incur any loss. This is consistent with the norm
specifying that the level of capital holding should increase
with riskiness.
The two inequalities after the regulator’s objective
function are called incentive-compatibility constraints
for H-type and L-type banks. We denote them by 
and  , respectively. These constraints guarantee that
each bank will select the contract appropriate to its
type. By choosing the wrong contract, a bank will have to
pay a higher cost. Any pair of contracts that satisfy the
incentive-compatibility constraints is one of a number of
possible solutions.
Case 1:    for 
In this case, the minimum cost curve—where the first-
order condition is satisfied—for H-type banks is always
below the curve for L-type banks (Chart 2).
Chart 2 also depicts the iso-cost curve, where the
total cost remains constant (reverse U-shaped function).
The curvature of the iso-cost curve is easily verified. The
slope of the curve is always 0 when it crosses the minimum
cost curve. The reason is that, in the case of H-type banks,
is zero whenever the first-order condition is satisfied.
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Chart 3





































Next, we check the marginal cost. Additional
capital will influence the total cost through two different
channels. First, it will reduce the range of   in which the
penalty is imposed (penalty cost-saving effect), so that the
more capital the bank holds, the less expected cost it will
incur. Second, more capital means the total cost of raising
capital increases (capital cost effect). On the right-hand-side
of the minimum cost curve, the iso-cost curve is downward
sloping because the marginal cost is positive. In other
words, the capital cost effect exceeds the penalty cost-
saving effect, so that the more capital the bank holds, the
more costly it is. Hence, to retain the same level of cost,
the penalty rate needs to be reduced. On the left-hand-side
of the minimum cost curve, the iso-cost curve is upward
sloping because the marginal cost is negative. In other
words, the penalty cost-saving effect exceeds the capital
cost effect, so that the more capital the bank holds, the less
costly it is. Hence, to retain the same level of cost, the pen-
alty rate needs to be raised.
Here, the menu of contracts can be incentive com-
patible. One example of the menu is depicted in Chart 2. If
the regulator provides   and  , L-type
banks will choose the former and H-type banks will choose
the latter. The menu options minimise the loss function of
the regulator (that is, the menu identifies the level of
capital that satisfies the first-order condition, and H-type
banks are offered a higher level of capital). The menus also
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for an H-type bank and
for an L-type bank.
At the same time, the regulator offering the
unique penalty rate also guarantees incentive compati-
bility because the penalty rate minimises the loss func-
tion. To see this point, suppose that the regulator offers
 in Chart 2. The pairs of   and   are
incentive compatible, namely that
for an H-type bank and
for an L-type bank.
Because this model and the original approach
satisfy both incentive compatibility and the require-
ment that riskier banks hold more capital, the menu of
contracts with different penalty rates may not be neces-
sary: As long as the single penalty rate is offered by the
regulator, the regulator’s objective is fulfilled.10
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Chart 4















Case 2: for   close to 0
for   close to 1
In case 2, the minimum cost curves intersect at 
(Chart 3).
In the precommitment approach, any penalty rate
that lies between   and   will yield the same result as in
case 1. A problem arises, however, when a penalty rate
above   is imposed. Here, the regulator can no longer
achieve its objective: Although the capital levels chosen by
the banks are incentive compatible, the regulator incurs an
additional loss by letting L-type banks hold more capital
than H-type banks. Our approach, however, may be able to
overcome this problem. Suppose that in Chart 3 the regula-
tor offers two contracts,   and  . It is indeed the
case that L-type banks choose the first contract and H-type
banks choose the second (incentive compatibility is satis-
fied). Moreover, the regulator achieves its objective by
minimising the loss: an additional loss is not incurred as
long as H-type banks choose to hold more capital than
L-type banks.
We therefore propose two modifications to the
precommitment approach. First, the regulator collects nec-
essary information concerning banks’ risk characteristics so
that it will not impose a penalty rate above  . Any pen-
alty rate between   and   will achieve the objective: the
regulator will be able to assess each bank’s riskiness by
observing the level of capital that the bank chooses to hold.
Second, the regulator again collects necessary information
on banks’ riskiness and provides banks with two contracts
having different penalty rates. Note that both modifica-
tions would require regulators to gather extensive informa-
tion about banks’ risk characteristics.
Case 3: for   close to 0
for   close to 1
Our final case is the opposite of case 2 (Chart 4).
In the precommitment approach, any penalty rate above
 will yield the same result as in case 1, but 
must be avoided. Unfortunately, our approach may not be
able to overcome this difficulty. When one of a pair of con-
tracts deals with a penalty rate below  , the regulator’s
objective cannot be achieved, because H-type banks are
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permitted to hold less capital. To achieve the normative
capital requirement, two contracts must thus be offered
with penalty rates above  . The regulator’s objective can
also be achieved by offering the single penalty rate as in the
precommitment approach, under the condition that the
regulator knows  , the penalty rate at which the two
minimum cost curves intersect. Perhaps it would be sim-
pler to rely on the single penalty rate above  —in which
case incentive compatibility is automatically satisfied—
rather than to design a menu of contracts that requires the
regulator to ensure that incentive compatibility is satisfied.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a model from the perspective of
mechanism design and demonstrated that, in some cases,
the penalty also plays an important role in persuading risk-
ier banks to hold more capital than less risky banks. 
In the original precommitment approach frame-
work, the regulator can allegedly discover a bank’s riskiness
by offering a unique penalty rate. Nonetheless, the
appropriate level of capital for each bank depends on the
bank’s private information, such as the shape of its investment
return’s density function. Thus, it is not certain that
riskier banks always choose to hold more capital than less
risky banks.
We then developed a model of mechanism design
in which the regulator offers a menu of contracts represent-
ing different levels of capital and the corresponding pen-
p3
p3
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alty rates. We found that the regulator can implement
incentive-compatible contracts in which banks with one
level of riskiness voluntarily separate themselves from
banks with other levels of riskiness. 
We examined three cases. In case 1, if the cumula-
tive density for H-type banks is always greater than the
cumulative density for L-type banks, then both the pre-
commitment framework and our approach achieve the
regulator’s objective: The level of capital holding is equiva-
lent to the amount specified by the first-order condition. In
addition, the level of capital holding increases as the bank’s
riskiness goes up. In this case, it would probably be easier
for the regulator to implement the original approach rather
than to offer contracts with various penalty rates. In case 2,
the cumulative density for H-type banks is greater than the
cumulative density for L-type banks for small amounts of
capital; the cumulative density is smaller for large amounts
of capital. In this instance, our model may be able to
achieve the regulator’s objective. By contrast, in the pre-
commitment approach, the penalty rate must fall within a
particular range; otherwise, the regulator’s objective is not
completely fulfilled in that incentive compatibility is satis-
fied but the normative capital requirement is not achieved.
In case 3, we examined an instance in which the cumula-
tive density for H-type banks is smaller than the cumula-
tive density for L-type banks for small amounts of capital,
whereas cumulative density is greater for large amounts of
capital. In case 3, neither approach achieves the regulator’s
objective as long as either one or two penalty rates take the
value where the cumulative density for H-type is smaller. To
avoid this, the penalty rate must be set in the range where
the cumulative density for H-type is larger. Then, both the
precommitment approach and our modification of this
approach achieve the regulator’s objective. In this instance,
it would probably be easier, as in case 1, to implement the
original approach.
We have demonstrated that both the precommit-
ment approach and our approach have limitations that pre-
vent them from achieving the optimal result as specified in
the regulator’s objective function. Here, the key element is
how much information the regulator needs to assess banks’
risk characteristics. In their recent paper, Kupiec and
O’Brien (1997) also note the importance of information to
regulators attempting to develop the incentive-compatible
regulation. Future research must examine the amount of
necessary information and the extent to which there may
be a limit to the amount of pressure the regulator can place
on banks to disclose their riskiness truthfully.
As we have observed, incentive-compatible con-
tracts cannot be provided unless the regulator obtains
certain information. In this sense, incentive-compatible
regulation will not replace the traditional role of the regu-
lator as an ex ante monitor of banks: The provision of
incentive-compatible contracts and the monitoring by the
regulator can be complementary. On a related matter, it has
been proposed that the regulator’s penalty be replaced by
public disclosure. In other words, whenever a bank’s actual
loss exceeds its precommitted value, the regulator will
inform the market of the fact. Such a proposal might be
feasible if market participants have the necessary informa-
tion to assess others’ riskiness and if market participants
can impose a penalty that satisfies incentive compatibility.152 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 NOTES
ENDNOTES
This is a revised version of the paper presented at the conference. The author thanks
discussant Pat Parkinson and other participants in the conference, especially Jim
O’Brien, for useful comments and criticisms. Any errors are the author’s. The views
expressed here are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Bank of Japan.
1. Kupiec and O’Brien (1995) stress that since the regulator’s objective
is to let banks precommit levels of capital that satisfy the desired value-
at-risk (VaR) capital coverage, it is incentive compatible as long as banks
achieve the regulator’s goal: Incentive compatibility is allegedly satisfied
if they hold the amount of capital that is equivalent to the desired VaR
capital requirement.
2.  in equation 2 is the probability that losses exceed the level of
capital, which represents the basis for a VaR capital requirement.  In this
interpretation of incentive compatibility, it does not matter whether
banks with higher risk levels hold higher capital: As long as they hold
the right amount of capital consistent with the desired VaR capital
requirement, they are regarded as incentive compatible with the
regulator’s objective. We feel this interpretation is rather unique.
Generally speaking, incentive compatibility may not be an instrument
that ensures consistency with the principal’s objective. There may be a
case where a capital requirement is inconsistent with the principal’s
objective, which nevertheless does not satisfy incentive-compatibility
constraints.
3. To be more precise, we take the riskiness of banks as exogenous. This
may contradict what Kupiec and O’Brien maintain. The underlying idea
of the precommitment approach claims that banks, after being offered a
penalty rate, would either commit capital, adjust risk, or do both to
satisfy the first-order condition. Here, the riskiness is taken as an
endogenous strategy for the banks. Nonetheless, if we view both the risk
adjustment and capital holding as endogenous variables, banks do not
have any preference-ordering among the pairs of these variables as long
Fk – ()
as they satisfy the first-order condition. Then there may not be an
incentive for banks to “separate.” They can be pooled by choosing the
same pair. Consequently, the regulator may not need to identify banks’
characteristics.
4. To be fair, Kupiec and O’Brien’s recent paper (1997) mentions that
the regulator should collect information in order to assess banks’ risk
characteristics.
5. Kupiec and O’Brien are critical of such simplifying assumptions as
first-order/second-order stochastic dominance.
6. These cases may not cover all the possibilities. As the bank portfolio
becomes more complex, the shape of the distribution becomes more
complex as well, and the cumulative densities for H-type and L-type
banks may intersect repeatedly. Still, the fundamental idea developed in
this section can be applied to more complex cases.
7. Note that the opposite case—in which the cumulative density for
H-type is always smaller than the one for L-type—does not exist.
8. Note that we have implicitly assumed that all these events—from
case 1 to case 3—take place in the feasible range for the level of capital
holding.
9. We have neglected individual rationality constraints for H-type
and L-type by simply assuming that the regulator will not offer contracts
that exceed the reservation level of cost for both types.
10. This observation implies that the precommitment approach is a
special case of our model, where  (that is, the penalty rates
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